

IT Foundation Management

- A new approach to security



Thomas Siebold

OpenVMS TUD

Bad Homburg, 27. October 2011

Thomas Siebold

- 33 years of experience in IT
- with
 - Digital Equipment GmbH & Corporation
 - Compaq Computers EMEA
 - Hewlett Packard EMEA & GmbH
- Representative for Stromasys (D,A,CH)
- Reseller and service provider for TDi (D,A,CH)
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- www.sitco-consulting.biz, www.sitco-consulting.de



Tdi Technologies

- Founded by Bill Johnson
- Headquarter in Dallas, TX Metroplex
- In business >20 years
- ~300 Customers, 3200 Installations
- Privately Held
- Profitable and Growing
- Numerous awards as a high-growth technology company
- Products: ConsoleWorks, ITFM Suite
- www.tditechnologies.com
- <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VZqpk-ZkNpA>



- Founded by Robert Boers
- Headquarter in Geneva, Switzerland
- Main focus of business:
 - Virtualization of PDP-11, VAX and Alpha systems. With this virtualized hardware, all software on those platforms can run unmodified on Windows without requiring source code, conversion or code modification.
 - Migration of applications from older platforms to new and modern platforms and operating systems
- CHARON-VAX, -AXP, -PDP11

IT Foundation Management




**The Global Leader in
IT Foundation Management**

What is the IT Foundation?

The IT Foundation includes all of your:

Servers... Blades... Network Gear... SANs... Operating Systems...
Virtual Machines... Databases... Appliances... Networks... Environment...
Applications...



And is supported by:



I'm Joe...
Solaris Systems
Administrator



Cheryl,
Oracle DBA...



Steve,
I'm a SANs
Administrator



Hi. Raphael.
Network
Administration



Dave,
Independent
Consultant



Hi I'm Tania,
Linux Systems
Administrator




Michael...
VM
Administrator



Chris here...
Tools Manager

IT Foundation Management



Privileged Interfaces



YIELDING:

- + Automatic documentation
- + Unified role based access & control
- + Improved Governance
- + Reduced Risk
- + Information Assurance
- + Persistence – never loses control

Privileged Users



I'm Joe...
Solaris Systems
Administrator



Cheryl,
Oracle DBA...



Steve,
I'm a SANS
Administrator



Hi. Raphael.
Network
Administration



Owen,
IT Operations
Manager



Hi I'm Tania,
Linux Systems
Administrator



Michael...
VM
Administrator



Rhet here...
Tools Manager

DELIVERS:

- Foundational System
- Unified Security Model
- Advanced Compliance Practice
- Transparency & Oversight

DRIVING:


- ✓ Control
- ✓ Simplification
- ✓ Common Practices
- ✓ Transparency
- ✓ Reliability
- ✓ Quality



IT Foundation Management Suite

-- Security Foundation Management

Outsider vs Insider, or... low-probability, high-impact



Insider – What ?

- *Insider*
 - is someone who has legitimate access to an organization, its systems, information or other resources.
- Insider threat
 - is a risk that an insider can misuse their access or knowledge to cause harm to the organization/business.
- Insider weakness
 - where an insider performs unsafe actions or fails to apply adequate protection that may expose the organization to accidental damage or malicious attack.

Security Foundation – Questions to ask !

Who has access to the master control interfaces on your hardware?

Who... including employees, contractors, service technicians...?



What they have brought in, and what they have taken out?

What can they DO?

Have they been compromised?

What have they DONE?

What authority do these interfaces have?
(Senior Engineer)

"I can do ANYTHING I want."

*Are they angry?
Tired? Stressed?*

Insider Threat – So what !?

- Information Security Group, London:
 - 68% of respondents said that it is the biggest threat to their intellectual property and other sensitive data
 - <http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/>

- Carnegie Mellon University's COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (CERT)
 - 2010 CYBERSECURITY WATCH SURVEY:
 - 51% of respondents still victims of an insider attack, despite previous experience
 - Remains constant with previous two surveys in 2007 and 2006
 - 67% of respondents: Insider incidents more costly than external breaches
 - <http://www.allbusiness.com/crime-law/criminal-offenses-cybercrime/13781867-1.html>
 - http://www.cert.org/insider_threat/

Insider data breach costs Bank of America over \$10 million

- 26 May 2011
- **The US Secret Service estimates that a data breach at Bank of America in California and other western states cost the bank at least \$10 million.**
- *A former bank employee provided customer information to people outside the bank, who used the data to steal money from around 300 Bank of America customers in California and other western states.*
- A report by IDG News Service [quoted](#) James Kollar, special agent for the Secret Service in Los Angeles, as estimating that criminals stole at least \$10 million from the bank.
- The *Los Angeles Times* [reported](#) this week that the criminals were able to obtain names, addresses, social security numbers, phone numbers, bank account numbers, driver's license numbers, birth dates, email addresses, mother's maiden names, PINs, and account balances.

Data theft campaign spanning 14 countries

- 04 August 2011
- **A total of 70 organizations spanning 14 countries were victimized by a five-year operation, likely carried out by a foreign government, that stole intellectual property and other proprietary information, according to a new report by McAfee Labs.**
- The targeted organizations included the US, Canadian, Vietnamese, and Taiwanese governments, the International Olympic Committee, companies from a broad range of industries, and a US national security nonprofit organization.
- The perpetrators stole national security secrets, source code, bug databases, confidential email archives, negotiation plans, document stores, legal contracts, industrial control configurations, design schematics and a lot of other proprietary information.

What does the security Foundation Defend against?

Insider Threat Demographics

Source of Company Security Threat


Partners outdistance employees as a source for threats against company assets.

| | Source | Likelihood | Impact (Number of Records Affected) |
|-----------|----------|------------|-------------------------------------|
| All | External | 73% | 30,000 |
| | Internal | 18% | 375,000 |
| | Partner | 39% | 187,000 |
| Financial | External | 56% | 4,000 |
| | Internal | 38% | 175,000 |
| | Partner | 41% | 151,250 |
| Food | External | 80% | 30,000 |
| | Internal | 4% | 200,000 |
| | Partner | 16% | 125,000 |
| | | | 45,000 |
| | | | 250,000 |
| | | | 112,500 |
| | | | 500,000 |
| | | | 1,107,600 |
| | | | 6,000,000 |

Insider Impact: 10x greater
Insiders impact more than 10x as many records per Incident

Data Source: 2008 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Supplemental Report

Internal Versus External Security Threats to Enterprise Security by Company Size




Insiders are Greatest Threat
...in very large enterprises: double (2x) that of outsiders!

Source: IDC, 2006

Security Foundation Coverage

Round and Round We Go

The lifecycle of insider breaches



security Foundation Defends against System privilege abuse - 54% of all insider breaches

Source: Verizon 2009 Data Breach Investigation Report

Insider theft was most costly incident type

Qx: "Please quantify the total hard-dollar costs of the incidents over the last 2 years. Include any fines, legal fees, out-of-pocket investigation expenses, and forensics consulting. Do not include "soft" labor/productivity issues."

| Type of Incident | Cost of incidents, last 2 years | Cost per incident |
|---|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Rogue employee stole company documents (n=92) | \$380,701 | \$362,572 |
| Outside business partner lost laptop (n=77) | \$320,137 | \$340,571 |
| Outside attacker compromised a server (n=68) | \$313,754 | \$295,994 |
| IT administrator abused privileges (n=73) | \$312,044 | \$452,238 |
| Outside business partner lost data via other means (n=88) | \$303,268 | \$115,751 |
| Supply chain or business partner abused privileges (n=66) | \$289,815 | \$362,269 |
| IT lost unencrypted backup media (n=84) | \$277,481 | \$179,020 |
| Theft by terminated employee (not de-provisioned) (n=86) | \$265,759 | \$160,096 |

6 of top 8 Threats Defended against by the Defense Foundation.

Average cost per Incident = \$302,000 USD

FORRESTER



2010 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT

A study conducted by the Verizon RISK Team in cooperation with the United States Secret Service.

The Insider Threat?

WHO is Behind Data Breaches?

70% resulted from external agents (-9%)

48% were caused by insiders (+26%)

11% implicated business partners (-23%)

27% involved multiple parties (-12%)

Source: 2010 Data Breach Investigations Report

HOW do Breaches Occur?

48% involved privileged misuse (+26%)

40% resulted from hacking (-24%)

38% utilized malware (=)

28% employed social tactics (+16%)

15% comprised physical attacks (+6%)

Source: 2010 Data Breach Investigations Report

WHAT Commonalities Exist?

98% of all data breached came from servers

85% of attacks were not considered highly difficult

61% were discovered by a third party

86% of victims had evidence of the breach in their logs


96% of breaches were avoidable through simple or intermediate controls

79% of victims subject to PCI DSS had not achieved compliance

Source: 2010 Data Breach Investigations Report

The Challenges are Driven by Complexity

Siloed Operation. Multiple Applications.
Many Methods. Labor Intensive.



Common Monitoring Methods



CORPORATE NETWORK

LOG FORWARD REQUIRES:

- Operating System
- Network Services
- Active Network Connection
- Blind Broadcast

AGENT-BASED REQUIRES:

- Operating System
- Network Services
- Active Network Connection
- Installed Agent



BLIND SPOT

“The GAP”

ITFM is bottom-up, outside in, closing the gap

CORPORATE NETWORK




DOESN'T REQUIRE:

- Operating System
- Network Services
- Active Network Connection



ELIMINATES **BLINDSPOT** BY:

- Capturing Serial Console Events
- Capturing Extended OS Events
- Capturing Console **Actions** (serial & OS)
- Securing consoles (role-based security model)
- Closing Incident Management Loop
- Maintaining control in ALL OPERATING MODES



IT FOUNDATION NETWORK

ITFM is, outside in,

Inside Out (traditional)

Needs agents, operating system, network

VS

Outside In (ITFM Suite)

Needs NO agents, NO operating system, NO network

New Capabilities that Drive Success

Traditional Practices


Persistence: **Normal Operation**
Documentation: **Manual**

- ⚠ Secured in Normal Mode Only
- ⚠ Documentation is by hand

IT Foundation Management

Persistence: **All Modes**
Documentation: **Automatic**

- 🔗 Persistent connection
- 🔗 Full security in all modes
- 🔗 Full documentation in all modes including:
 - ✔ Normal Operation
 - ✔ Maintenance
 - ✔ Configuration
 - ✔ Failure






IT Foundation Management Suite

-- Operations Foundation Management

Operations -- traditional

Has GAP in practice
 Work occurs in Silos
 Many tools, no system

IT Architecture




IT Foundation
 Privileged Interfaces

THE GAP

Operations – with IT Foundation Management

IT Foundation Privileged Interfaces

PRIVILEGED INTERFACES ARE MANAGED
SILOS ARE INTEGRATED
ACCESS IS UNIFIED
SYSTEM CONTROL IS ESTABLISHED
WORK IS OPTIMIZED



Simplification, Oversight, and Management

Simplification

- Manages all Privileged Interfaces with ONE system
- Encodes and automates common tasks
- Provides universal operations methodology
- Centralizes management

Transparency and Oversight

- All Privileged User actions automatically recorded
- Access control centralized
- Authorization centralized
- Compliance automated
- Management centralized

Improved Maintenance

- Automates repetitive actions
- One maintenance methodology
- Automatic forensic history creation
- Serves all platforms
- Improves efficiency

Transparency and Oversight

With the Traditional Approach...



- ⚠️ We require access to be controlled
- ⚠️ We require changes to be documented
- 🚫 I have records, but I do not have a means to verify them



- ⚠️ We are required to manually document changes
- ⚠️ Usually we do that immediately after making a change



- ⚠️ Sometimes things are very busy, and we have to document changes later on
- 🚫 Sometimes changes just don't get documented....

With IT Foundation Management...

- ✅ Access is enforced against Policy through IT Foundation Management
- ✅ All change records are available in real-time: recorded down to the key stroke
- ✅ Verification is simple and accurate: always



- ✅ The system documents changes for us automatically: in real-time

WE DON'T HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT DOCUMENTING CHANGES - WE JUST CONCENTRATE ON DOING OUR JOBS!






IT Foundation Management Suite

-- Compliance Foundation Management

IT Foundation Compliance Challenges

Daily Changes Occur:

Break/Fix, Incidents, Configuration, Patching, and Maintenance



Compliance Requires:

Change Control and Documentation



Yet foundational changes are often recorded manually, resulting in:

- Ⓛ Inaccurate information
- Ⓛ Incomplete records
- Ⓛ Documentation lag
- Ⓛ Large time consumption (cost)
- Ⓛ Impossible to verify
- Ⓛ Lack of transparency/oversight

Consequences Include:

Undo Risk and Cost to the Business

Inadequate Records

- Ⓛ FTE Back-filling Gaps
- Ⓛ Fines

Human Error


- Ⓛ Service Disruptions
- Ⓛ Sensitive Data Breaches

Lack of Control

- Ⓛ Out-of-policy activity
- Ⓛ Out-of-policy access
- Ⓛ Lagging Response (often long after-the-fact)

Command and Control

IT Foundation Management Delivers Real-time Policy Enforcement



With IT Foundation Management:

ALL Foundational Changes are Recorded Automatically...

- I'm Joe...
Solaris Systems Administrator
- Hi. Raphael.
Network Administration
- Steve,
I'm a SANS Administrator
- Hi I'm Tania,
Linux Systems Administrator
- Cheryl,
Oracle DBA...
- Michael...
VM Administrator



...in All Modes.





IT Foundation Management Suite

-- Services Foundation Management


IT Foundation Service Management

Foundation Services Management:

- 1) Applications write data to logs
- 2) Updates are Captured in Real-Time
- 3) Information is scanned for Events
- 4) Events are Assigned Proper Priority
- 5) Events have Clear Explanations
- 6) Actions are Automatically Executed



Understanding the IT Services Foundation




SERVICE-RELATED MESSAGES

| Messages are Output from: | Message Type | Description |
|---|--------------------|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Custom Applications •User Customizations •Packaged Applications | Context | Meaningful dialog: "Credit Limit Exceeded for Customer XYZ" |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Custom Applications •User Customizations •Packaged Applications •Components/Libraries | Activity /Tracking | Status: Received, Start, Stop, Suspend, Resume, Transfer, Complete, etc. |

GENERAL MESSAGES

| Messages are Output from: | Message Types | Description |
|--|----------------|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Packaged Applications •Components/Libraries •Operating Systems •Hardware | Vendor Defined | Generic: (critical, error, warning, information) |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Custom applications | User Defined | Generic: (critical, error, warning, information) |

Managing the IT Services Foundation



Key Differentiators

IT Foundation Management Empowers Service Success:



- All message sources monitored in real-time
- Messages captured as they are output
- All messages digitally time-stamped for correlation



- Non-invasive (no agent software to install)
- Virtually no performance impact
- Spans B2B Service Chains




- Comprehensive pattern recognition
- Powerful Script Engine for complex scenarios
- Supports internal and external automation

▪ Supports internal and external automation




Technology

Protecting the IT Infrastructure



Overview



OPERATING SYSTEM

- HP OpenVMS 8.2 or later
- Windows Server 2003, 2008
- Sun™ Solaris™ 8 or 10
- Red Hat® Enterprise Linux® Server 4.0
or later
- Novell® SUSE™ Linux Enterprise Server 9.0
or later
- Ubuntu latest
- Debian latest

HARDWARE PLATFORM

Alpha™, Itanium™

Intel®, AMD

UltraSPARC®

Intel, AMD

Intel, AMD

Intel, AMD

Intel, AMD

Vendor related data: Intelligent Event Modules

The screenshot shows a Mozilla Firefox browser window displaying the TDI Technologies website. The address bar shows the URL <http://support.tdiTechnologies.com/iems>. The page header features the TDI logo and the tagline "The Leader in IT Foundation Management Technologies". A navigation menu includes "Customer Support" and "Contact".

The main content area is titled "IEMs" and contains the following sections:

- Search**: A search bar.
- Customer Support**: A list of support topics including "Latest ConsoleWorks Release V4.4-0u1", "OpenVMS", "RedHat and SUSE Linux", "Sun Solaris", "Windows Server 2003", "IEMs", "Operating Systems", "Network Components", "Hardware", "Storage", "Applications", "Regulatory Compliance", "Emulators", "Final V3 Release V3.7-0u3 (VMS V3.7-0u5)", "OpenVMS", "RedHat and SUSE Linux", "Sun Solaris", "Windows 2000/2003", "Tru64 Unix", "HP-UX", "IBM AIX", "Product Documentation", "Installation Guides", "User Guides", "Release Notes", "CWClient User Guides", "Intelligent Event Modules", "FAQS", and "Communications Issues".
- IEMs**: A section with a lock icon and the text: "In order to access product downloads, you must be a TDI customer with a valid login. To get a login please contact TDI Support (see contact information on right)."
- IEM Downloads by Category**: A list of categories including [Operating Systems](#), [Network Components](#), [Hardware](#), [Storage](#), [Applications](#), [Regulatory Compliance](#), and [Emulators](#).
- IEM Downloads by Name (Alphabetical)**: A list of IEMs with their file names, sizes, and update dates. Examples include:
 - [Apache HTTP Server 1.3](#) (BIN, 0.8 MB) Updated 7/17/07 [PDF](#)
 - [Apache HTTP Server 2.0](#) (BIN, 1.6 MB) [PDF](#)
 - [APC PowerNet 3.8.4](#) (BIN, 1.7 MB) Updated 12/9/08 [PDF](#)
 - [BEA WebLogic 9.2](#) (BIN, 6.0 MB) [PDF](#)
 - [Brocade SilkWorm 3.0](#) (BIN, 1.06 KB) Updated 2/24/2011 [PDF](#)
 - [Brocade SilkWorm 4.1 \(SNMP\)](#) (BIN, 0.5 MB) Updated 12/15/08 [PDF](#)
 - [Brocade SilkWorm 4.2](#) (BIN, 1.6 MB) [PDF](#)
 - [Brocade SilkWorm 4.4](#) (BIN, 1.2 MB) [PDF](#)
 - [Check Point FireWall-1](#) (BIN, 0.37 MB) Updated 7/17/07 [PDF](#)
 - [Cisco ASA 8.1](#) (BIN, 3.6 MB) Updated 9/3/08 [PDF](#)
 - [Cisco Catalyst 4000/4500](#) (BIN, 1.0 MB) [PDF](#)
 - [Cisco IOS 11.3 \(and earlier\)](#) (BIN, 4.6 MB)
 - [Cisco IOS 12.3 \(and later\)](#) (BIN, 13.2 MB) [PDF](#)
 - [Cisco PIX Firewall 6.3](#) (BIN, 1.26 MB) Updated 1/8/09 [PDF](#)
 - [Cisco SAN-OS](#) (BIN, 3.05 MB) Updated 9/4/07 [PDF](#)
 - [Intel Itanium 2](#) (BIN, 0.6 MB) Updated 12/12/08 [PDF](#)
 - [InterSystems Caché 5.1](#) (BIN, 1.7 MB) Updated 3/18/09 [PDF](#)
 - [InterSystems Caché 2010.1](#) (BIN, 4.6 MB) [New! PDF](#)
 - [ISS Intrusion Detection Systems](#) (BIN, 19 KB) [PDF](#)
 - [Juniper Networks JUNOS 7.1](#) (BIN, 1.4 MB) Updated 1/12/09 [PDF](#)
 - [Juniper Networks NetScreen ScreenOS 5.1](#) (BIN, 0.67 MB) [PDF](#)
 - [Liebert UPS](#) (BIN 94KB) [PDF](#)
 - [Linux Kernel 2.4](#) (BIN, 28.5 MB) Updated 9/4/07 [PDF](#)
 - [Linux Kernel 2.6](#) (BIN, 27.6 MB) Updated 9/14/09 [PDF](#)
 - [Marconi MSB Switch 7.1](#) (BIN, 0.6 MB) [PDF](#)
 - [McDATA Spheron ES1000](#) (BIN, 84 KB) [PDF](#)
 - [McDATA Spheron ES3000](#) (BIN, 0.1 MB) [PDF](#)
 - [McDATA Spheron ES4300](#) (BIN, 0.1 MB) [PDF](#)
 - [McDATA Spheron ES4500](#) (BIN, 0.1 MB) [PDF](#)
 - [Microsoft Exchange Server](#)

On the right side of the page, there is a "HOW TO GET HELP" section with contact information for telephone, fax, and email support, as well as a "Phone in questions to support at" section with phone numbers. Below this is an "IMPORTANT NOTICE" section stating that support for ConsoleWorks 3.7 (3.7-0u0-3.7-0u5) ends on May 7, 2010, and a link to the TDI Wiki.

The background of the slide is a solid blue color with several lens flare effects. A prominent bright white light source is located in the upper left quadrant, creating a large, faint circular halo and several thin, radiating lines. Other smaller, dimmer lens flares are scattered across the blue background, including a small cyan one in the top left and a cluster of white and blue ones in the middle right.

References

Reference Customers

- Bank of America, Bank of England, BNY Mellon, Commerzbank, BNP Paribas, AIG, Handelsbanken, Computershare,...
- Direct TV, British Library,...
- Pfizer, Lahey Clinic, UCSF Medical Center, Mayo Clinic,...
- Fairchild, TriQuint Semiconductor, ESA,...
- HP & IBM (Managed Services)
- Verizon
- Utilities:
 - Kansas City, PECO (Philadelphia), Tacoma Power
 - Westar Energy (Kansas), CAISO (California), Pacificorp (Oregon)
 - Exelon Corp. (USA, \$18Bill revenue)

We focus on....

making software do what it can,

so that people can concentrate on what only humans can do!

Questions